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TERROR ON YOUR TIMELINE:  
CRIMINALIZING TERRORIST INCITEMENT ON 
SOCIAL MEDIA 
THROUGH DOCTRINAL SHIFT 
Zachary Leibowitz* 
 
The United States faces a barrage of threats from terrorist organizations 
on a daily basis.  The government takes some steps to prevent these threats 
from coming to fruition, but not much is being done proactively.  Any person 
can log into a social media account to preach hate and incite violence against 
the United States and its citizenry, and sometimes these words result in 
action.  When speakers are not held accountable, they can continue to incite 
the masses to violent action across the United States.  This Note proposes a 
new incitement doctrine to prevent these speakers from being able to spread 
their violent message on the internet, which might very well decrease the 
threats the United States faces and the number of tragedies it often 
experiences. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A Brooklyn man spends months gathering the necessary materials and 
information to carry out an attack.1  Inspired by a similar attack in Nice, 
France, he acquires a garbage truck and plans to drive through a large crowd 
in Times Square.2  Luckily, he is discovered and apprehended before the 
planned attack, thus saving the lives of innocent civilians.3  Unfortunately, 
the group that inspired him to attempt this attack remains at large.  The group 
with whom the man had been in contact will continue to incite others to 
lawless action, using social media as its platform.4  The speech used by this 
group posted on social media was instrumental in driving the man to plan this 
attack.5 
The United States persistently faces extremist threats—threats that by 
some measure amount to a constant state of war.  This war is not 
 
 1. This anecdote is loosely adapted from the facts of an investigation and pending case. 
See NY1 News, Brooklyn Man Accused of Supporting Times Square Terror Plot, SPECTRUM 
NEWS NY1 (Nov. 22, 2016, 4:47 AM), http://www.ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/news/2016/11/ 
21/brooklyn-man-accused-of-supporting-times-square-terror-plot.html 
[https://perma.cc/9P87-PBH4].  
 2. See id.  In 2015, a group of terrorists supporting the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS) drove a cargo truck through a beach promenade in Nice, France, on Bastille Day, killing 
more than eighty people. Id.   
 3. Id. 
 4. Id.  The Nice attacker made multiple trips to Yemen. Id.  The government claims he 
was attempting to be recruited and trained by ISIS, while the attacker claims he was simply 
visiting his family that lives there. Id. 
 5. “Incite” means “to provoke or stir up (someone to commit a criminal act, or the 
criminal act itself).” Incite, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  The meaning of 
“incite” in this Note varies depending on the legal interpretation applied.  For purposes of this 
Note, incitement is used to connote the prompting of someone to commit (1) illegal action or 
(2) action that would likely cause harm to the general public. 
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characterized by a single, named enemy and has persisted for the past two 
decades.  But with the increasing adoption and use of technology and social 
media, the United States now faces unprecedented challenges in combating 
enemies and protecting citizens.  Terrorists routinely employ social media to 
recruit new members, indoctrinate the easily influenced, and incite 
individuals and terrorist cells to violence.6 
Over the past century, the U.S. Supreme Court has grown increasingly 
more protective of the individual’s freedom of speech, safeguarded by the 
First Amendment.7  Indeed, the early twentieth century witnessed the 
development of modern First Amendment doctrine, particularly in the realm 
of inciting or inflammatory speech.8  But prior to the modern formulation of 
speech doctrine, courts in the United States took a more proactive approach 
to stopping lawless action.9  Moreover, the United Kingdom and Israel have 
interpreted their freedom of speech doctrines narrowly, mimicking the early 
Supreme Court’s tendency to muzzle dangerous and inciting speech to fight 
terrorism more effectively.10 
Accordingly, this Note explores the prevalence of terrorist speech on social 
media—specifically, recruitment activities, indoctrination, and calls for 
violence—and attempts to cabin such speech in the context of current speech 
doctrine.  This Note also examines the national security threat and highlights 
how other constitutional rights have been curtailed to further national security 
interests.  Ultimately, this Note contends that current First Amendment 
speech doctrine is overprotective of such speech and presents too 
burdensome a barrier to restrict terrorist incitement on social media.  This 
Note concludes that regulation of inciting terrorist speech should be allowed 
as a matter of public safety, public policy, and pragmatism. 
Part I examines the history of First Amendment doctrine, with a particular 
focus on incitement and abstract teaching or advocacy.  This Part also 
explores the history of social media and how it differs from other forms of 
expression and communication.  Finally, Part I discusses the challenges 
surrounding the criminal prosecution of social media users. 
Part II examines the deficiencies of current First Amendment doctrine; 
specifically, it suggests that current doctrine needlessly protects dangerous 
speech that should, in certain circumstances, be subject to criminal penalties.  
 
 6. This Note assumes all social media posters are within the jurisdiction of the United 
States, but this certainly is not always the case.  When individuals post outside of the United 
States, it is uncertain whether the First Amendment would apply or whether the U.S. federal 
judicial system could assert personal jurisdiction. 
 7. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for 
a redress of grievances.”); see also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (per 
curiam) (articulating that the current standard for protection of incitement under the First 
Amendment is very robust); infra Part I.A (discussing the development of modern First 
Amendment doctrine).  This Note focuses on the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. 
 8. See infra Part I.A.1. 
 9. See generally Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 
249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
 10. See infra Part I.A.4. 
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It next inquires into national security policy and highlights how other areas 
of law in the United States have evolved due to increased threats of terrorism.  
Part II goes on to explore how other countries have adapted their own 
approaches to regulating social media speech, while the United States has 
remained stagnant in First Amendment doctrine development. 
Part III suggests that speech doctrine should be modified to better handle 
twenty-first-century terrorist threats, which are administered in greater 
proportion by ever-increasing social media use.  To facilitate this goal, this 
Note proposes that the federal judiciary borrow facets of older First 
Amendment doctrine, as well as speech doctrines of foreign governments, to 
implement a new standard.  This standard will be constitutional, will allow 
for the prosecution of those who use social media as a vehicle to incite 
terroristic behavior, and will be modular, so that the doctrine and standards 
adapt based on geopolitical climate. 
I.  FREE SPEECH AND THE RISE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
When the Constitution was framed, avenues for speech existed in a 
radically different landscape.  Speech entailed a limited number of actions:  
the act of speaking and printed text.  Although technology has developed 
rapidly in the past two centuries, most First Amendment doctrine has not 
similarly evolved.  In fact, existing doctrine has instead been applied to new 
forms of communication.11  The doctrine for most forms of communication 
evolved more slowly and did not correctly adapt to newer forms of 
technology, and the change was too slow to effectively protect individual 
rights and the government’s interest.12  The modern era is thus left with an 
antiquated style of thinking applied to a method of speech and expression that 
had not been contemplated at the time of the framing of the Constitution or 
the subsequent judicial application of the law.13  The question becomes:  How 
well has the doctrine been adapted to the new form, and is it effective enough 
to be justified? 
Part I.A takes an in-depth look at incitement doctrine throughout U.S. 
history and at how the current U.S. incitement doctrine is applied.  
Additionally, Part I.A examines scholarly commentary on past and current 
incitement doctrine, highlighting the relevant strengths and critiquing the 
weaknesses.  Part I.A concludes by discussing the incitement doctrine of 
other nations compared to that of the United States. 
Part I.B discusses the rise of the internet and social media and how those 
rises have changed the way speakers can be prosecuted.  In addition, Part I.B 
explores how terrorists have used social media to further their agendas. 
 
 11. David R. Dow & R. Scott Shieldes, Rethinking the Clear and Present Danger Test, 
73 IND. L.J. 1217, 1219 (1998). 
 12. Id. In fact, in some instances, the originalist theory may have been a more effective 
way to govern speech today; while the medium may have changed, the purpose of speech has 
not. See id. 
 13. See John P. Cronan, The Next Challenge for the First Amendment:  The Framework 
for an Internet Incitement Standard, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 425, 427–28 (2002). 
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A.  Tracing the History of Inciting Speech 
In the early years of the twentieth century, the government and the 
judiciary were far more concerned with the government’s interests in 
protecting the citizenry and increasing the country’s global presence.14  
Speech doctrine reflected that end through limiting individuals’ rights to 
question the government and call for its overthrow or dismantlement.15  As 
time progressed and the population became more exposed to liberal thought, 
speech doctrine also liberalized to reflect this change, thus becoming more 
protective of individuals’ rights of expression.16  Public commentary 
illustrates how and why these changes occurred, and it also examines how 
the United States’ speech doctrine compares to those of various other 
governments. 
1.  Inflammatory Speech Through Time 
The right of free speech is one of the most prominent aspects of the United 
States’ national identity and the Supreme Court has gone to great lengths to 
protect this right.17  While speech is highly protected in this country, it is not 
an absolute right; some speech is not protected because it has “low value.”18  
Low-value speech has traditionally included threats, obscene material, and 
violence-inciting speech.19  To be clear, such examples of speech are not per 
se illegal:  they merely fall beyond the protection of the First Amendment, 
and the government may enact statues that prohibit or restrict their use.20  
Indeed, some speech is regulable even though the regulation is based on the 
content of the speech.21  The Court develops tests to determine when such 
speech may or may not be regulated.22  These tests constitute a kind of 
categorical balancing.23 
 
 14. See GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES:  FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE 
SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 174 (2004). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 454 (2011).  Phelps concerned the Westboro 
Baptist Church protests during funerals of fallen service members to promote the Church’s 
antihomosexual agenda. Id. at 443.  The Court concluded that while the actions taken by the 
Westboro Baptist Church were deplorable and extremely offensive, the Church’s speech was 
protected under the First Amendment because speech that entails matters of public concern 
brings social and political issues to light in the community. See id. at 454 (giving examples of 
extremely offensive and repugnant messages that are nonetheless protected by the First 
Amendment’s guarantees). 
 18. See Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1150–73 
(2005). 
 19. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 363–64 (2003); Miller v. California, 413 
U.S. 15, 19–20 (1973); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1969) (per curiam); 
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51–52 (1919).   
 20. See 18 U.S.C. § 871 (2012) (prohibiting threats against the president and successors); 
18 U.S.C. § 2101 (2012) (prohibiting the incitement of riots). 
 21. See, e.g., Black, 538 U.S. at 359–60 (explaining limitations on speech that is 
threatening); Miller, 413 U.S. at 36–37 (placing restrictions on speech that is obscene). 
 22. See Robert A. Sedler, The “Law of the First Amendment” Revisited, 58 WAYNE L. 
REV. 1003, 1009–10 (2013). 
 23. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448–49; see also Volokh, supra note 18, at 1136–38. 
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The development of the Court’s incitement doctrine began in the early 
1900s and continued through the 1960s, and the Court has not changed its 
interpretation or application since.24  While other areas of constitutional law 
have developed along with technology, especially post-September 11, 
2001,25 First Amendment jurisprudence in the context of incitement has 
remained extremely protective of the individual’s speech right.26 
Most of the Court’s doctrine on inciting speech developed in a series of 
early twentieth-century cases.  In Schenck v. United States,27 the first modern 
case addressing incitement, the defendant was charged under the Espionage 
Act of 191728 for urging men who had been selected for the draft to reject 
their obligation.29  The defendant communicated the message through mailed 
leaflets, which contained “impassioned language” urging men to “[a]ssert 
your [r]ights” and to “not submit to intimidation” from the federal 
government.30  The Court, focusing on the effect of the speech, upheld the 
conviction and created the “clear and present danger” test.31 
As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, writing for the Court, noted, “of course 
the document would not have been sent unless it had been intended to have 
some effect, and we do not see what effect it could be expected to 
have . . . except to influence [people] to obstruct [the draft].”32  This case, in 
effect, stood for the proposition that incendiary33 speech was meant to bring 
about a specific effect for those consuming it.34  Speech became properly 
regulable if the “words used are used in such circumstances and are of such 
a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the 
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.”35  Although the ruling 
in Schenck did not turn on the clear and present danger test, it was a 
 
 24. See Dow & Shieldes, supra note 11, at 1217–20.  Indeed, this Article was written pre-
9/11; since then, nothing has changed in First Amendment incitement doctrine. Zachary M. 
Mattison, America’s War on Terror Goes into Cyberspace.  Will the First Amendment Prevent 
the Government from Giving Chase?, SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP., Fall 2005, at 105. 
 25. See infra Part II.A (discussing how the USA PATRIOT Act allowed for greater access 
to private information and punished any form of support to a designated terrorist organization). 
 26. See Dow & Shieldes, supra note 11, at 1218–19. 
 27. 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
 28. 18 U.S.C. §§ 792–799 (2012).  The Espionage Act of 1917 was enacted shortly after 
the United States entered World War I. Espionage Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-24, § 1, 40 
Stat. 217, 217–19.  The Act prohibited any interference with the operations of the U.S. 
government or U.S. military and promotion of the success of its enemies. Fern L. Kletter, 
Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Federal Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 793 to 794, 59 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 303 Art. 1 (2011).  The amendments of the Sedition Acts of 
1918 went further to prohibit any disloyal or abusive language about the U.S. government. Id.  
When defendants were charged under the Sedition Act, it was recorded as the Espionage Act 
because the Sedition Act was an amendment to the original Espionage Act. Id.  The Sedition 
Act amendments were repealed in 1921. KENNETH C. CREECH, ELECTRONIC MEDIA LAW AND 
REGULATION 25 (6th ed. 2013). 
 29. See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 51.  
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 52. 
 32. Id. at 51. 
 33. Incendiary speech is the same as incitement speech for purposes of this Note. 
 34. See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 51–52. 
 35. Id. at 52.  
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supplement to upholding the conviction of a man who had circulated a leaflet 
encouraging draft dodging, a “substantive evil” that Congress had authority 
to prevent.36 
This was a turning point in First Amendment law.  Prior to this case, speech 
could be criminalized only if it had a “bad tendency,” a test rooted in English 
common law.37  Speech was considered to have a bad tendency when it 
caused harm to public welfare or incited illegal activity.38  This test was less 
speech protective than the clear and present danger test and was part of the 
general progression to a more speech-protective doctrine. 
Still, the standard that Holmes created did not get the reverence he desired.  
In Abrams v. United States,39 a similar set of facts led to another conviction 
under the Espionage Act, but the clear and present danger test was 
supplementary to the bad tendency test in upholding the conviction and 
affirming the constitutionality of the Act.40  The Court stated that the speech 
in this instance was incitement and not purely political speech because it was 
“not an attempt to bring about a change of administration by candid 
discussion” but rather an attempt to paralyze the country in a time of war 
through a general strike.41 
Justice Holmes dissented from the opinion of the Court and claimed that 
the ruling was not in line with the clear and present danger test he had set 
forth earlier that year.42  In this dissent, however, Justice Holmes further 
refined the test and argued that, for the government to constitutionally 
regulate speech, it must show not only a present danger, but a “present danger 
of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about that warrants Congress in 
setting a limit to the expression of opinion.”43  Immediacy is a theme that the 
Court later included in the doctrine,44 but in a later case, Holmes expressed 
his true feelings regarding the Court’s application of the incitement 
standard.45  Justice Holmes wrote that speech may be further proscribed in a 
time of war, but during peacetime the laws should be more forgiving as the 
U.S. government is not under attack.46  This type of reasoning also indicates 
that speech regulation that is constitutional during wartime very well could 
be unconstitutional during times of peace.47 
In Gitlow v. New York,48 the Court upheld the conviction of a man who 
“advocate[d] and urge[d] in fervent language mass action [to] . . . overthrow 
and destroy organized parliamentary government.”49  The “Left Wing 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907). 
 38. See id. 
 39. 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
 40. See id. at 622. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 625 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 43. Id. at 628 (emphasis added).  
 44. See generally Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
 45. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 46. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 47. See id.  
 48. 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
 49. Id. at 665. 
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Manifesto” in question advocated, advised, and taught that organized 
government (in this case, the U.S.  government) should be overthrown by 
force, including violence.50  The Court held that, because there was a 
“revolutionary spark [that] may kindle a fire that . . . may burst into a 
sweeping and destructive conflagration” in the defendant’s distributed 
manifesto, the speech was punishable under the clear and present danger 
test.51 
In what appears to be sarcasm, Justice Holmes remarked that “[e]very idea 
is an incitement” because every idea is intended to bring about some sort of 
change.52  He went on to criticize the majority for abusing the clear and 
present danger test and misunderstanding the imminence factor.53  In 
retrospect, it appears that what Holmes intended was for the Court to 
investigate causation in these cases—to determine if the speech would likely 
cause imminent lawless action, which is incitement by today’s standards.54 
2.  Incitement Doctrine Today 
Twenty-four years after the Court articulated the clear and present danger 
test, the Court transitioned to the modern approach regarding inciting speech.  
In Brandenburg v. Ohio,55 Brandenburg was convicted under the Ohio 
Criminal-Syndicalism Statute as a leader of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) for 
incendiary statements that he made on television.56  The speech at issue was 
his claim that, if the government continues to suppress the white race, then 
“it’s possible there might have to be some revengeance [sic] taken.”57  The 
Supreme Court overturned his conviction and held that the speech at issue 
was protected under the First Amendment.58 
While the Court noted that Brandenburg’s comments were deplorable, it 
determined that the government could not proscribe such speech.59  The 
Court found that Brandenburg’s language could not be viewed as incitement 
because it did not specify a time for attack, nor was it an immediate call to 
action.60  Instead, Brandenburg’s comments could at most be characterized 
as a call for action in the indefinite future.61  As such, the Court ruled that his 
speech constituted advocacy for change, and thus could be considered speech 
spurring political debate.62  Such speech, the Court held, could not be 
 
 50. See id. 
 51. Id. at 669. 
 52. Id. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 53. See id. 
 54. See Dow & Shieldes, supra note 11, at 1217. 
 55. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
 56. Id. at 446.  Brandenburg’s speech included statements such as “[s]end the Jews back 
to Israel” and “[b]ury the niggers.” Id. at 446 n.1. 
 57. Id. at 446. 
 58. Id. at 449. 
 59. Id. at 447. 
 60. Id. at 447–48. 
 61. Id. at 448. 
 62. Id. at 447–48. 
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silenced by government regulation.63  As a result, the Court found the 
underlying statute unconstitutional.64 
In stark contrast to the earlier Supreme Court cases, Brandenburg did not 
turn on the clear and present danger test:  the Court found it too mechanical 
and formulaic.65  Instead, the Court employed a test that mimicked what 
Justice Holmes had stressed in his dissents decades earlier.66  Drawing from 
what Holmes proffered as incitement, the Court developed the imminent 
lawless action test, also known as the Brandenburg test.67  Under this test, 
speech that is “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and 
is likely to incite or produce such action” may be proscribed.68  For a person 
to be punished for inflammatory speech:  (1) there must be an intent to cause 
imminent lawless action, (2) the action must be imminent, and (3) there must 
be a likelihood that imminent lawless action will occur.69 
Brandenburg shifted away from the earlier doctrine under which speech 
advocating for lawlessness or for the overthrow or impediment of U.S. 
government operations could be criminalized.70  In Brandenburg’s 
aftermath, speech considered advocacy for reform—whether by violent 
overthrow, political discussion, or abstract teaching—could no longer be 
proscribed or categorized as incitement.71  In brief, First Amendment 
doctrine became more liberal and protective of individual rights.72 
The Supreme Court has not employed the test in a case of national security 
since the test’s articulation in 1969.73  Brandenburg itself hardly considered 
aspects of national security as it involved a small sect of the KKK advocating 
to overthrow the government using hypotheticals.74  Yet, although the Court 
 
 63. Id. at 448–49. 
 64. Id. (explaining that the statute criminalized advocating or teaching the duty, necessity, 
or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of 
accomplishing industrial or political reform). 
 65. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 515–17 (1951) (plurality opinion) 
(explaining that the clear and present danger test was not a pure mathematical formula, it was 
able to be reduced to something close to that). 
 66. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See id.  This test is currently employed by the Court.  The likelihood factor is what 
Justice Holmes referred to as “proximity and degree.” Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 
52 (1919). 
 70. See Dow & Shieldes, supra note 11, at 1234–35. 
 71. See id. 
 72. See generally Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444; Hans A. Linde, “Clear and Present 
Danger” Reexamined:  Dissonance in the Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1163 
(1970). 
 73. See David L. Hudson Jr., Landmark Case Sets Precedent on Advocating Force, FIRST 
AMEND. CTR. (June 8, 2009), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/landmark-case-set-
precedent-on-advocating-force [https://perma.cc/XA9K-K9AM].  The cases from the earlier 
part of the century all centered on national security in some respect. Id.  The nation was at war 
and the incitement that the cases considered was not focused on rioting or incitement to 
murder, but rather incitement to overthrow the government or attack many people. Id. 
 74. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447–48. 
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has made few comments about the test, some lower courts have applied its 
standard.75 
For instance, the Court applied the standard in Hess v. Indiana,76 where a 
protestor claimed that he would “take the fucking streets” at a later, undefined 
time.77  The lower court determined that his language was incitement and 
could be punished, but the Supreme Court stressed the importance of 
immediacy and ruled that Hess’s speech could not amount to more than a 
mere suggestion aimed at the indefinite future.78 
In Bible Believers v. Wayne County,79 the Eastern District of Michigan 
ruled that speech intended to anger a target audience could not be considered 
incitement to lawless action.80  The court used the Brandenburg standard to 
determine that the speech was constitutionally protected even though it was 
offensive and meant to infuriate.81  The opinion cites Eugene Volokh, noting 
that it is hard to find speech that rises “to such a dangerous level that it can 
be deemed incitement” and that there will hardly ever be enough evidence 
for a jury to find a party guilty.82 
In In re White,83 the Eastern District of Virginia considered whether blog 
posts by the defendant constituted incitement under Brandenburg.84  The 
defendant’s posts included threats to an individual and advocated the use of 
violence against others.85  The court held that the blog posts did not amount 
to incitement under Brandenburg because there was no advocacy for 
imminent lawless action.86  It stated that posting words on the internet alone 
was not sufficient evidence that the defendant’s suggested actions were likely 
to be immediately carried out by his readers.87  Finally, the court held that 
advocating for violence or harm is not removed from First Amendment 
protections when the imminence factor of Brandenburg is not satisfied.88 
3.  Scholarly and Public Commentary on Incitement Doctrine 
The application of the Brandenburg test has been minimal but 
straightforward over the last fifty years, with no doctrinal developments.  
There has, however, been a large amount of published scholarship and 
journalistic think pieces that discuss the efficacy of Brandenburg and urge 
reconsideration of the test.89  Responses to the doctrine have been both 
 
 75. See infra notes 79–87 and accompanying text. 
 76. 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam). 
 77. Id. at 107. 
 78. See id. at 108–09.  
 79. 805 F.3d 228 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 80. See id. at 228. 
 81. See id. 
 82. See id. at 244. 
 83. No. 2:07CV342, 2013 WL 5295652 (E.D. Va. Sept. 13, 2013). 
 84. Id. at *38–41. 
 85. See id. at *21–22. 
 86. Id. at *62. 
 87. Id.  
 88. See id.  
 89. See generally Dow & Shieldes, supra note 11; Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Incendiary 
Speech and Social Media, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 147 (2011); Linde, supra note 72. 
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defensive and critical with each side setting forth various arguments that 
would either promote the continued use of Brandenburg or call for a 
reevaluation of it.90 
Some scholars have suggested that there are two distinct sides to the issue, 
and various judges have aligned themselves with one or the other.91  On the 
one hand, judges that prioritize security are more inclined to proscribe 
speech; on the other hand, those who prioritize freedom of expression tolerate 
a greater risk of harm to achieve that end.92 
The purpose of keeping language unrestricted is to promote political 
discussion.93  Speech that could be classified as incitement is often not meant 
to spur imminent lawless action but rather action in the political sphere meant 
to influence positive change.94  Indeed, language that uses hyperbole and 
triggers emotion can influence people to make a change.95 
Some suggest that the American Revolution was a result of incendiary 
speech and that, without the founders publishing their thoughts, the United 
States would not have come to be an independent nation.96  The calls to break 
free from the ties with England and to form a new nation would likely not be 
protected under Brandenburg today.97  The intent was to bring about 
imminent lawless action against the current government through the 
formation of militia and declaration of independence.98 
By contrast, the current standard mostly lies in the reality of what happens 
after particular speech is disseminated.  In most cases—when nothing comes 
of the speech—then there is no case for prosecution due to the imminence 
and likelihood requirements.99  Under the current doctrine, the government 
essentially must wait for something terrible to happen to prevent a speaker 
 
 90. See Linde, supra note 72, at 1183–86. 
 91. See id. 
 92. See Alexander Tsesis, Terrorist Speech on Social Media, 70 VAND. L. REV. 651, 665–
67 (2017); see also Alexander Tsesis, Social Media Accountability for Terrorist Propaganda, 
86 FORDHAM L. REV. 605, 620–28 (2017). 
 93. See Volokh, supra note 18, at 1150–51. 
 94. See Sedler, supra note 22, at 1020–22.  
 95. See id.  The issue is that speech meant to inspire change through lawful means can 
also inspire people to attempt to invoke change through unlawful means. Id.  If the Court 
upholds the proscribing of political speech, it is certainly too restrictive of First Amendment 
rights. Id.  But if the Court does not allow for regulation of speech that is likely to incite 
violence, there is a great risk of harm to the public. See id. 
 96. See Laura Stampler, Here’s Some Incredible Pro-Independence Propaganda from the 
American Revolution, BUS. INSIDER (July 4, 2015, 4:35 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/ 
pro-independence-propaganda-from-the-american-revolution-2015-7 [https://perma.cc/9PPS-
3YSD] (discussing propaganda, such as Benjamin Franklin’s “Join, or Die” poster and books 
such as Thomas Paine’s Common Sense, as acts intended to prompt people to join a revolution 
and subvert British colonial control). 
 97. See supra Part I.A.2.  Revolutionaries would speak and publish their thoughts 
regarding independence from England. James E. Leahy, “Flamboyant Protest,” The First 
Amendment and the Boston Tea Party, 36 BROOK. L. REV. 185, 210 (1970).  They called for 
the Boston Tea Party through speech that (1) was directed to incite imminent lawless action 
and (2) was likely to cause that action (and indeed, did). See id. at 187; see also Brandenburg 
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). 
 98. See id. 
 99. See Linde, supra note 72, at 1181–82. 
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from acting because likelihood and imminence are difficult to prove without 
threatened or inspired action actually occurring.100 
4.  Foreign Incitement Standards 
The United States has borrowed much of its common law from the United 
Kingdom for the sake of continuity, and much of it remains today.101  As a 
former British colony, the population had a familiarity with British law.102  
The United Kingdom maintains a zero-tolerance policy toward speech that 
may incite terrorism; the current operative statute is unforgiving to promoters 
of terror attacks.103  Specifically, the statute punishes the encouragement of 
terrorism and the dissemination of terrorist publications.104  The types of 
speech that constitute encouragement of terrorism include glorification, 
direct and indirect inducement to prepare or instigate acts, and even reckless 
dissemination of this type of speech.105  Although the British statute uses the 
word “encouragement” as opposed to the word “incitement,” the two words 
effectively have the same meaning.  Encouragement is equivalent to 
incitement under U.S. law, but without the likelihood and imminence 
requirements.106 
The recent case of R v. Choudary107 demonstrates how the United 
Kingdom’s doctrine is practically applied.108  Anjem Choudary was 
convicted under the Terrorism Act 2000109 for encouraging individuals to 
travel to Syria and fight for the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).110  
Choudary had stayed within the bounds of the law for some time but was a 
prominent supporter of radical Islam and a lecturer that frequently promoted 
Sharia law.111  Nothing he initially said or promoted amounted to 
 
 100. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. 
 101. See Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4–5 
(1936). 
 102. See id. 
 103. See generally Terrorism Act 2006, c. 11, pt. 1 (Eng.).  The Act was written and enacted 
in response to the 2005 London subway bombings committed by the terrorist organization Al 
Qaeda. See Ian Cobain, London Bombings:  The Day the Anti-Terrorism Rules Changed, 
GUARDIAN (July 7, 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/jul/07/london-bombings-
anti-terrorism [https://perma.cc/5APB-25T8].  
 104. See Terrorism Act 2006, c. 11, pt. 1, §§ 1–4 (Eng.). 
 105. See id. § 2. 
 106. Compare Terrorism Act 2006, c. 11, pt. 1, § 1 (Eng.) (stating that encouragement to 
lawless action amounts to a violation of the law), with Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 
447 (1969) (per curiam) (noting that encouraging lawless action is the same as inciting 
imminent lawless action but that encouraging does not require that the intent and effect be 
imminent and that there be a likelihood that the speech causes the effect).  
 107. R v. Anjem Choudary [2016] EWCA (Crim) 61 (Eng.). 
 108. Id. 
 109. See generally Terrorism Act 2000, ch. 11 (Eng.) (creating various offenses including 
terrorist fundraising and weapons training).  This act is similar to the 2006 act but covers a 
broader range of crimes.  For the purposes of this Note, it is safe to assume that the Terrorism 
Act 2006 would also apply. 
 110. See Jamie Grierson et al., Anjem Choudary Convicted of Supporting Islamic State, 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 16, 2016, 10:32 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/aug/16/ 
anjem-choudary-convicted-of-supporting-islamic-state [https://perma.cc/227X-SYSU]. 
 111. Id. 
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encouraging terrorism or inviting support for a terrorist organization.112  
Later, however, Choudary was arrested, and the court ruled to uphold his 
conviction, concluding that inviting the support for a terrorist organization 
through speech amounted to giving the organization the “oxygen of 
publicity.”113  While Choudary’s prior speech was considered appalling and 
dangerous, it did not rise to a level of criminality under the United Kingdom’s 
laws until he encouraged others to become part of an organization at war with 
“the West.”114 
Israel is another country with laws that often closely resemble those of the 
United States.115  This is possibly because Israel shares the same fundamental 
values of democracy and individual liberties as the United States and because 
Israel is one of the United States’ closest allies.116  In comparison to U.S. 
law, it is easier for the government to prove incitement under Israeli law.117  
The standard the Israeli judicial system uses is the “near certainty test.”118  
Under this test, free speech will be limited only in the event of a national 
security concern.119  There has to be a “near certainty that national security 
and public safety will be harmed and that the harm is grave, serious and 
severe.”120 
Israeli law is more protective of national security than the current U.S. 
doctrine because Israel is under a constant terror threat.121  Terror 
organizations, and even other countries in close proximity to Israel, have 
called for Israel’s destruction.122  In that type of hostile climate, the Israeli 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. R v. Anjem Choudary [2016] EWCA (Crim) 61, [46] (Eng.) (quoting the lower court’s 
decision). 
 114. See id.; see also Grierson et al., supra note 110. 
 115. See Michal Buchandler-Raphael, Incitement to Violence Under Israeli Law and the 
Scope of Protection of Political Speech Under Israeli Freedom of Speech Jurisprudence:  A 
Comparative Analysis and an Alternative Perspective 3 (Aug. 2007) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://works.bepress.com/michal_buchhandler_raphael/1/ [https://perma.cc/ 
R24M-PLS2] (arguing that, even though Israel does not have a written constitution like the 
United States, that does not mean that human and individual rights fall by the wayside, as they 
are protected by the Israeli judiciary). 
 116. See id. at 3–6 (noting that Israel has a great reverence for democracy and free speech 
rights, that it is the only country in the Middle East with a functional democracy, and that it 
has a political system in which the government can be criticized without fear of persecution, 
much like the United States). 
 117. See id. at 6. 
 118. Id. at 6–7. 
 119. See id. 
 120. Id. at 6.  
 121. Victims of Palestinian Violence and Terrorism Since September 2000, ISR. MINISTRY 
FOREIGN AFF., http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/terrorism/palestinian/pages/victims 
%20of%20palestinian%20violence%20and%20terrorism%20sinc.aspx [https://perma.cc/ 
RND2-SLQK] (last visited Oct. 16, 2017). 
 122. See, e.g., Eliott C. McLaughlin, Iran’s Supreme Leader:  There Will Be No Such Thing 
As Israel in 25 Years, CNN (Sept. 11, 2015, 7:48 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/10/ 
middleeast/iran-khamenei-israel-will-not-exist-25-years [https://perma.cc/6KEJ-JRND] 
(explaining that the Iranian government has called for the destruction of Israel and hopes that 
there will be no country of Israel within twenty-five years and that there will be no serenity 
for Israel until it is destroyed). 
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government must be willing to step in at an earlier point to stop an attack, as 
the risk of an attack being carried out is much higher.123 
B.  A More Connected World, A More Complex World 
Before the 9/11 attacks, the internet was in its developmental years.124  It 
was unclear how revolutionary the internet was going to be.125  The attack 
occurred well before Facebook was even a thought on the Harvard 
campus.126  After Facebook’s founding, social media quickly became a way 
to supplement online communications such as email.127  The fundamental 
difference between email and social media, however, was that the latter was 
created to connect many people from many regions and to bring ideas 
together on a platform open for discussion. 
In 2000, there were approximately 738 million internet users; in 2015, 
there were over 3.2 billion.128  Social media is where most of the connection 
occurs—over 33 percent of internet users, approximately 1.32 billion people, 
are daily active users of Facebook.129  Facebook is used for sharing ideas 
between like-minded groups and “friends”; however, people can see posts of 
items that their friends promote or follow.130  Twitter, a site and application 
on which users may post messages to their followers, and where their 
followers may “retweet” those posts,131 has a monthly active user base of 313 
million.132 
With nearly half the world population using the internet and a significant 
portion of internet users on social media, the world has become a much 
smaller place.  Information is accessible to anyone with an internet 
 
 123. See Victims of Palestinian Violence and Terrorism Since September 2000, supra note 
122. 
 124. See generally Barry M. Leiner et al., Brief History of the Internet, INTERNET SOC’Y 
(Oct. 15, 2012), https://www.internetsociety.org/internet/what-internet/history-internet/brief-
history-internet [https://perma.cc/8JEU-ZRUM]. 
 125. See Leiner et al., supra note 124.  For a detailed discussion of terrorism and internet 
intermediaries, see generally Raphael Cohen-Almagor, The Role of Internet Intermediaries in 
Tackling Terrorism Online, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 425 (2017). 
 126. See Sarah Phillips, A Brief History of Facebook, GUARDIAN (July 25, 2007, 5:29 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2007/jul/25/media.newmedia [https://perma.cc/ 
2LVV-RWFL].  Founder Mark Zuckerberg was developing Facebook at Harvard University 
in 2004. See id. 
 127. See Newsroom, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ [https://perma.cc/ 
R8KY-7QQM] (last visited Oct. 16, 2017). 
 128. Press Release, Int’l Telecomm. Union, ITU Releases 2015 ITC Figures (May 26, 
2015), http://www.itu.int/net/pressoffice/press_releases/2015/17.aspx [https://perma.cc/7JPG 
-QXD6]. 
 129. See Newsroom, supra note 127. 
 130. See id. 
 131. Each message sent out is a tweet and to retweet is to take a message sent by someone 
and then send it to another user’s set of account followers.  Getting Started with Twitter, 
TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/215585 [https://perma.cc/825C-BUFN] (last 
visited Oct. 16, 2017).  This can often lead to a message that was only sent to an audience of 
a certain size being sent to a much larger group of people, some of whom may have not been 
considered when sending the original message. Id. 
 132. See Company, TWITTER, https://about.twitter.com/company [https://perma.cc/HG9K-
WEAH] (last visited Oct. 16, 2017). 
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connection, and people can quickly react to that information.  Indeed, with 
this type of access and open and dynamic infrastructure, there are new 
challenges that governments face, particularly in the realm of criminal 
activity on social media. 
1. Prosecution Based on Social Media Presence 
While the internet has provided access to useful information and 
revolutionized communication, it has also opened the door for new ways to 
commit crimes, to disseminate illegal information and content, and to 
promote the advocacy of imminent lawless action.133  Not everything that is 
deemed illegal by statute can be prosecuted, but there are methods by which 
law enforcement agencies may track down and prosecute people committing 
crimes on the internet.134 
The traditional way that law enforcement identifies offenders is through an 
individual report of an online post.  The Supreme Court first encountered 
social media postings when a woman reported her estranged husband’s 
Facebook comments to the police.135  The defendant posted rap lyrics 
indicating that he was going to harm his wife and her coworkers.136  His 
conviction for violating a federal statute prohibiting any communication 
containing a threat of personal injury was upheld at the district and appellate 
levels but overturned by the Supreme Court because his words did not 
amount to a true threat.137  The Court noted that when words are posted 
online, it becomes harder to prove whether the speaker had the requisite 
intent.138  Prosecutors trying to prove incitement face this same hurdle.139 
Another way the government finds and prosecutes speakers on the internet 
is through the FBI and other law enforcement agencies combing the web.  
The FBI tracks publicly available information on social media, such as tweets 
and Facebook posts through social media monitoring software.140  This 
information is already available to many companies that utilize similar 
software to develop marketing and advertising plans.141  So long as the FBI 
and other law enforcement agencies do not use their monitoring software to 
 
 133. Crimes based on social media presence include:  possessing and distributing child 
pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (2012), posting threats to or stalking individuals online, 18 
U.S.C. § 2261A (2012), identity theft, 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2012), and using the internet to 
commit bank or wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012).  
 134. See Kate Green, Catching Cyber Criminals, MIT TECH. REV. (Mar. 9, 2009), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/405467/catching-cyber-criminals/ [https://perma.cc/ 
5QR8-C97C]. 
 135. See generally Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015). 
 136. Id. at 2005–07.  
 137. Id. at 2002. 
 138. Id. at 2012–13. 
 139. See id.  
 140. See Jared Keller, The FBI Wants to Read Your Tweets, ATLANTIC (Jan. 26, 2012), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/01/the-fbi-wants-to-read-your-tweets/ 
252059/ [https://perma.cc/Z97J-XYY8]. 
 141. See id.  
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view private correspondences and instead limit tracking to public information 
only, they are acting within their legal bounds.142 
When the government uses this type of surveillance to monitor social 
media speech, it is mostly looking for terrorist activity or general threats to 
national security.143  The recent conviction of Tarek Mehanna under the USA 
PATRIOT Act (the “Patriot Act”) for providing material support to a terrorist 
organization144 was the result of the government’s surveillance of his social 
media activity.145  While some viewed this conviction as an assault on First 
Amendment rights, the court did not cite the content of his speech or his 
beliefs as the bases for his conviction but rather his role in providing support 
to a designated terrorist organization.146 
While there are difficulties in proving intent of social media speech due to 
the wide audiences it reaches, it is nevertheless possible under certain 
circumstances for the government to combat crime effectively on this 
medium.  Technology exists to track keywords and trends on social media.147  
Moreover, the FBI has planned to purchase technology that tracks the 
geolocation of social media users to further analyze speakers’ contexts and 
to track them if warranted.148  This will help prosecutors to determine what 
the intended effect of speech is in incitement cases, which is required under 
Brandenburg.149 
2.  How Terrorists Use Social Media 
Terrorists both at home and abroad have taken full advantage of the “fruits 
of globalization” by using the internet to orchestrate assaults and attacks from 
many locations.150  Because terrorists are no longer geographically 
restrained, their network has expanded and they are able to reach far more 
people than before.151  It is no longer necessary for a terror organization to 
have an active website; instead, the organization can use social media to reach 
out and provide information to its audience.152  Previously, an interested 
 
 142. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); cf. U.S. 
CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”). 
 143. See Keller, supra note 140. 
 144. See infra Part II.A (discussing the material-support provision of the Patriot Act). 
 145. See Andrew F. March, A Dangerous Mind, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/22/opinion/sunday/a-dangerous-mind.html 
[https://perma.cc/H4LL-XEKT]; see also United States v. Mehanna, 735 F.3d 32, 44 (1st Cir. 
2013). 
 146. See Mehanna, 735 F.3d at 46. 
 147. See Keller, supra note 140. 
 148. See Social Media Monitoring Platform, FED. BUS. OPPORTUNITIES (Sept. 15, 2015, 
10:43 AM), https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=ec695b317a2a3d17 
51354c42e3d9eb02 [https://perma.cc/F7XV-CHSD].  
 149. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). 
 150. Gabriel Weimann, Terror on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, BROWN J. WORLD 
AFF., Spring/Summer 2010, at 45, 45 (2010). 
 151. See id. at 45–46. 
 152. See id. at 48–51.  
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individual would have to search actively for an organization’s website.153  
Now, the same person who may not have been interested enough to search 
on his or her own is more likely to stumble across a message or post from a 
terrorist organization on social media.154 
When a terrorist organization posts on social media, it often includes 
videos of its fighters training and killing as well as messages from its 
leaders.155  The videos are intended either to inspire viewers to commit 
similar acts or to instill fear in viewers by demonstrating what the 
organization is capable of doing.156  Additionally, many posts occur in the 
form of pictures accompanied by text, or text alone.157  These posts are 
intended to inform, recruit, and incite people whom the organization believes 
it can convince of its cause.158 
Since terrorists’ adoption of social media, there have been more frequent 
attacks and more threats of attacks than at any other period in time.159  While 
the vast majority of terror attacks have occurred in the Middle East,160 the 
number of attacks in the United States has increased, and “lone wolf” 
terrorists have increased in number.161  A lone wolf is a person who acts 
without the explicit backing of an organization but is indoctrinated and 
inspired, or incited to act, by a terrorist organization or ideology.162  For 
reference, the 9/11 attacks were planned and carried out by Al Qaeda, but 
lone wolf terrorists carried out the San Bernardino massacre in 2015.163 
The lone wolf is often a homegrown terrorist—someone who was born in 
the country he or she is attacking and became radicalized by some form of 
online content or through acquaintances.  Not all homegrown terrorists are 
 
 153. See id. at 48. 
 154. See id. 
 155. See Jason Burke, How the Changing Media Is Changing Terrorism, GUARDIAN (Feb. 
25, 2016, 1:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/25/how-changing-media-
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 156. See id. 
 157. See Weimann, supra note 150, at 52–53. 
 158. See id. 
 159. See Lazaro Gamio & Tim Meko, How Terrorism in the West Compares to Terrorism 
Everywhere Else, WASH. POST (July 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/ 
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Terrorism Getting Worse?  In the West, Yes.  In the World, No., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2016), 
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the-world-no.html [https://perma.cc/CEL7-6RF8]. 
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Deadly, PBS (July 14, 2016), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/lone-wolf-attacks-
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 162. See id. 
 163. On their Facebook pages, the San Bernardino shooters pledged their allegiance to ISIS 
prior to carrying out the attack that killed fourteen people. See Michael S. Schmidt & Richard 
Pérez-Peña, F.B.I. Treating San Bernardino Attack as Terrorism Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/05/us/tashfeen-malik-islamic-state.html 
[https://perma.cc/KD2C-R2RR]. 
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the product of extreme Islamic terror organizations; some are the product of 
white hate groups such as the KKK164 and antigovernment militia groups.165 
Terrorism is a tactic that requires constant communication and recruitment 
efforts.166  It is not about the sheer numbers a terrorist organization can amass 
at once; rather, the effectiveness of a terrorist campaign is its ability to recruit 
without being stopped.167  ISIS’s rapid ascent to prominence shows that 
social media has added fuel to the fire.168  As mentioned above, however, 
“recruitment” no longer means calling upon would-be recruits to come to an 
area and be trained.169  Recruitment now means being indoctrinated with 
materials available online—posts on Twitter and Facebook, documents, or 
videos on YouTube.170 
There are many cases in which social media has been a significant factor 
in the planning or carrying out of terrorist activity.  The anecdote mentioned 
in the Introduction is just one example of a terrorist being called to action.171  
The San Bernardino shooters pledged their allegiance to ISIS in an online 
post before carrying out their attack.172  Choudary also illustrates how 
supporters of terrorism use social media to spread their message and incite 
people to join a cause.173  A nightclub shooter in Orlando, Florida, frequently 
viewed propaganda and violent videos distributed by ISIS, which 
investigators believe was critical in his indoctrination and incitement to 
action.174  Clearly, terrorist organizations present a global problem by 
furthering their goals via social media.  In the United States, there are limited 
ways to combat the problem. 
 
 164. The Brandenburg case was just one example of the KKK trying to incite lawless 
action; it is an extreme organization that has committed terrorist acts. 
 165. The Oklahoma City Federal Building bombers were homegrown terrorists. See United 
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 167. See id. 
 168. See Weimann, supra note 150, at 52–53. 
 169. See supra Part I.B.2. 
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 171. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text.  The anecdote was adapted from an actual 
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 173. See supra Part I.A.4. 
 174. See Del Quentin Wilber, The FBI Investigated the Orlando Mass Shooter For 10 
Months—And Found Nothing.  Here’s Why, L.A. TIMES (July 14, 2016, 3:00 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-fbi-investigation-mateen-20160712-snap-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/S3YZ-VVPA].  The FBI notes that watching a video is not illegal, but under 
a more stringent interpretation of the First Amendment, posting the video would be illegal and 
thus the video would not have been available for the shooter to watch. See id. 
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II.  STRIKING THE BALANCE BETWEEN 
LIBERTY INTERESTS AND CURTAILING TERROR 
In light of the recent surge in terrorist social media presence, the United 
States has in some respects compromised its national security by not taking 
measures to curtail incitement.  In 2016 alone, more than fifty people were 
killed in terrorist attacks.175  This Part describes how certain liberties have 
been curtailed in favor of the United States’ interests and efforts in security 
and public safety—in particular, the Fourth Amendment and the Patriot Act.  
In so doing, this Part also lays out alternative approaches to handling 
incitement and incitement-like speech, mirroring the same liberty-restricting 
approaches the government has employed in the name of national security in 
other contexts.  Such approaches to speech regulation range from the most 
speech protective to those most protective of national security.  Finally, this 
Part provides hypothetical scenarios that closely mimic relevant and related 
fact patterns to determine the point at which the government may step in and 
prosecute a person for his or her speech under the differing approaches. 
A.  The National Security Threat 
Since 9/11, the United States has placed great emphasis on national 
security.176  But the question remains:  Is the United States any safer than it 
was on 9/11?177  The area in which most American citizens see a change in 
their day-to-day lives post-9/11 is privacy.178  The government justifies 
invasions into personal privacy in the interest of stopping terrorist attacks 
before they occur.179  Accordingly, the FBI’s budget has tripled since 2001 
in an effort to monitor and stop terrorist activity.180 
Perhaps most remarkably, less than one week after 9/11, legislative steps 
were taken to combat future terrorist attacks, and less than two months later, 
the Patriot Act181 was signed into law.182  The Act was touted by the Justice 
Department as a tool to preserve life and liberty by “Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism.”183  The Justice Department attempted to 
 
 175. See 2016 Terrorist Attacks, ESRI, https://storymaps.esri.com/stories/terrorist-
attacks/?year=2016 [https://perma.cc/3Y8T-RQGA] (last visited Oct. 16, 2017). 
 176. See Steven Brill, Is America Any Safer?, ATLANTIC (Sept. 2016), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/09/are-we-any-safer/492761/ 
[https://perma.cc/XM96-SU48]. 
 177. See id. 
 178. See id. 
 179. See id. 
 180. See id. 
 181. United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in 
scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
 182. See WEIMANN, supra note 166, at 174 (explaining that governments are not as good at 
being preventative as they are reactionary and that it often takes a large event to spur change 
on the federal government level). 
 183. See The USA PATRIOT Act:  Preserving Life and Liberty, DEP’T JUST., 
https://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/what_is_the_patriot_act.pdf [https://perma.cc/BL3K-
2BT4] (last visited Oct. 16, 2017). 
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explain in simple terms what the Patriot Act allows—the interception of 
private communications made by citizens who the government suspects 
might be terrorists.184  Critics of the Patriot Act claim that it allows for 
warrantless, extrajudicial searches and seizures of private information in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.185 
An additional part of the Patriot Act that has garnered attention is the 
material-support provision.186  In the landmark decision Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project,187 the Supreme Court concluded that some types 
of speech, such as training and expert assistance, do not rise to the level of 
incitement but could be criminalized in certain instances.188  The Court 
explained that certain groups, even with lawful intentions, “are so tainted by 
their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates 
[prohibited] conduct.”189  The respondents did not challenge the secretary of 
state’s authority to determine which groups are designated terrorist 
organizations, and, therefore, which groups were covered by the statute.190  
In effect, so long as the executive branch deems an organization tainted, any 
form of advocacy or encouragement with respect to that group becomes 
punishable.191 
In his dissent, Justice Breyer claimed that this is the type of speech that the 
Brandenburg standard protects—advocacy that does not amount to 
incitement cannot be proscribed or punished.192  This notion, however, seems 
to confuse the point of the statute.  The statute is directed at those providing 
support; in this instance, support that could only come through speech.  
Incitement is unlikely to be categorized as support under the statute based on 
the definitions of support that Congress provided, and thus an inciting 
speaker could not fall under the statute’s coverage.193 
 
 184. See id. 
 185. See Surveillance Under the Patriot Act, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/infographic/ 
surveillance-under-patriot-act [https://perma.cc/ZK9G-3X49] (last visited Oct. 16, 2017).  The 
Patriot Act gives rise to many concerns. See Russell Berman, A Long-Awaited Reform to the 
Patriot Act, ATLANTIC (May 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/05/a-
long-awaited-reform-to-the-usa-patriot-act/393197/ [https://perma.cc/WQ4P-AGSX].  In 
2001, Congress was much more willing to work together to pass legislation targeted to protect 
national security because of the 9/11 attacks. Id.  Today, Congress is beginning to end the 
practice of bulk data collection. See id. 
 186. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2012) (prohibiting the knowing provision of support to a 
terror organization listed by the secretary of state).  Under the statute, material support includes 
tangible or intangible property; services such as financial services, lodging, training, and 
expert advice or assistance; weapons; money; and transportation. See id.  The Act does 
criminalize the provision of medical or religious services. See id. 
 187. 561 U.S. 1 (2010). 
 188. Id. at 33. 
 189. Id. at 38. 
 190. Id. at 9–10. 
 191. See id. 
 192. Id. at 44 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 193. See id. at 21–23 (majority opinion).  While incitement to terrorist action would seem 
to be more criminal than teaching a group to engage with the United Nations, such activity is 
not what Congress intended to criminalize. See id. 
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Many scholars have claimed that, over the years, various presidential 
administrations have exploited national security fears to pass legislation.194  
Some have argued that the Espionage Act of 1917195 was enacted by the 
government to suppress political dissent.196  Others claim that the Court 
adopted the clear and present danger test197 to further this end and to align 
the law with the national consensus.198  To this point, the Court often takes 
up the national consensus and considers external social conditions when 
expounding the law.199 
Scholars also assert that the Court should be particularly protective of 
individual liberties—especially free speech—during times of national 
security threats.200  During these “pathological times,” where the acceptance 
of unorthodox ideas becomes prevalent, the Court ought to uphold First 
Amendment freedoms.201  This argument is compelling, but it leaves plenty 
of room for disagreement.  Pathological times arise due to real concerns or 
fears felt by the public.202  Is the general public not entitled to believe that its 
safety at home is more important than being able to express its dissatisfaction 
with the government to the extent that it borders on incitement? 
B.  Doctrinal Approaches to Inciteful 
Terrorist Speech on Social Media  
Courts have rarely applied the Brandenburg test to social media cases.  
Accordingly, this Part applies alternative speech approaches to several 
hypotheticals and anecdotes.  This Part also explores standards from the 
earlier part of the twentieth century203 and other countries.204  In doing so, it 
attempts to determine at which point the government could step in and 
prosecute a terrorist speaker on social media for inciting speech in order to 
safeguard national security.205 
This Part applies various doctrinal approaches to the following 
hypothetical:  A person posts on his or her Facebook and Twitter profile, “I 
am calling on all supporters of our cause to wreak havoc in New York City.  
 
 194. See, e.g., STONE, supra note 14, at 74,; see also Vincent Blasi, The Pathological 
Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 449–50 (1985). 
 195. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 196. See STONE, supra note 14, at 146–47 (arguing that the Wilson administration passed 
the Act to quell the fears of World War I but later abused it to stop any form of questioning or 
criticizing of the government).  
 197. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 198. See STONE, supra note 14, at 146, 172, 184 (claiming that the government effectively 
convinced the population of the narrative that there was a reason for fear and concern regarding 
national security, and that to match the national consensus, the Court implemented the clear 
and present danger test to uphold convictions under the Act). 
 199. See Blasi, supra note 194, at 482–84. 
 200. See, e.g., id. at 449–50. 
 201. See id. at 450–51. 
 202. See id. 
 203. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 204. See supra Part I.A.4. 
 205. Of course, most prosecution for unlawful speech that falls beyond the scope of the 
First Amendment’s protections are rooted in statute.  In the hypotheticals that follow, this Note 
assumes the existence of such a statute. 
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We should consider attacking the enemy where they live and where they 
work.”  This internet speaker is based in New York and his post will reach 
roughly 50,000 people before any type of attack occurs.206  The “cause” the 
poster mentions is a hatred of the United States and its foreign policy.  In the 
past, this same poster has expressed his distaste with the U.S. government. 
1.  The Brandenburg Test 
For speech to be proscribed under Brandenburg it must be “directed to 
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and . . . likely to incite or 
produce such action.”207  If the Brandenburg test were applied to the above 
fact pattern the government would likely fail to convict, as it is similar to the 
actual fact pattern in Brandenburg.208  The fact pattern does not give a 
specific time when there would be an attack, it does not direct what to attack, 
and it does not give the nature of what the attack will be.209  Under 
Brandenburg, one may argue that the speaker meant to wreak havoc by 
starting a protest; attacking people at home or work could mean attacking 
their values and might not have anything to do with lawless action.210 
The hypothetical poster will not be convicted under Brandenburg for 
additional reasons.  First, there is no imminence factor; the speaker does not 
say “go attack right now,” and there is no way of determining when he meant 
for the attack to occur.  The imminence requirement under Brandenburg is 
strict; it is required in the speaker’s intent and the effect of the speech.211  
Second, there is no direction to cause lawless action.  The speech could be 
interpreted as a call to cause inconvenience and to verbally attack morals.  
This poster would be able to continue his speech, and even if there were an 
attack that stemmed from this noninciting speech, the speaker would be safe 
from prosecution. 
This is currently the best case for those desiring a speech-protective 
approach.  The value of having a speech-protective approach is that it allows 
social dissent and encourages political discussion.212  While the hypothetical 
fact pattern may not be the ideal example of speech that inspires political 
discussion, the cause mentioned could be something worth investigating and 
considering in the political arena.213  Even odious political speech can have 
 
 206. Often, once an attack that is linked to a social media post occurs, news networks cover 
it and cause the message to be received by a wider audience than originally intended. 
 207. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). 
 208. Compare supra Part II.B (explaining the hypothetical fact pattern), with Brandenburg, 
395 U.S. at 444–46 (reversing the conviction of a KKK supporter whose speech did not incite 
imminent lawless action). 
 209. See supra Part II.B. 
 210. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 446–48.  The speech at issue was necessarily 
hypothetical because it lacked a description of a specific time and place of attack. Additionally, 
the Brandenburg standard suggests a stronger presumption rather than incitement. See id. 
 211. See Dow & Shieldes, supra note 11, at 1235. 
 212. See Cronan, supra note 13, at 436. 
 213. The ideas that western ideals are incorrect, that certain values of politicians are 
corrupt, or that government policies are counterproductive and detrimental to groups of people 
are all ideas worth considering and should not be suppressed in a society that values free 
speech and the marketplace of ideas. See Sedler, supra note 22, at 1017–20.  
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value; it contributes to the democratic process and increases the breadth of 
ideas from which a population may draw to make decisions.214 
2.  Foreign Speech Doctrine 
There are several ways in which foreign countries handle inciteful speech.  
This Part examines and applies the standards of some nations that are similar 
to the United States.  There are many countries that do not allow social media 
access215 and others that limit free speech and would determine that almost 
any speech that could be considered incitement or criticism should be 
punished.216  Accordingly, this Note applies the laws of the United Kingdom 
and Israel to the hypothetical.  Unlike the United States, each of these 
countries would likely criminalize the speech presented in the hypothetical. 
a.  United Kingdom 
If U.K. law were applied to the hypothetical, it likely would result in a 
conviction for encouraging terrorist activity.217  The current laws in the 
United Kingdom allow the government to punish speakers who intentionally 
or recklessly encourage or glorify terrorist activity.218  The only problem with 
convicting the poster in the fact pattern is that prosecutors would need to 
prove that the call constituted terrorist activity.219 
Much like the speaker Choudary,220 this poster has previously expressed 
his disdain for the government and values of the West.221  The attack he 
speaks of can easily be viewed as promoting a terrorist activity if his previous 
posts are admitted as evidence.  The call for an attack is likely to be viewed 
as encouraging terrorist action because attacking people at their homes and 
offices reasonably could be understood as terrorist activity.  Additionally, 
under the Act it does not matter if the terrorist act actually occurs; what 
matters is whether the speech could cause terrorist action.222 
While this approach is very protective of national security, it heavily 
encroaches on free speech rights.  It proscribes incitement as well as 
encouragement.223  Prosecutorial discretion, however, is problematic in cases 
 
 214. See Volokh, supra note 18, at 1151 (noting that political speech is on “the highest 
rung” of importance). 
 215. See Jeremy Bender, 6 Countries That Block Social Media, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 6, 2015, 
3:10 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-six-countries-that-block-social-media-2015-4 
[https://perma.cc/4TJ5-UZ69] (explaining that certain countries that block social media access 
in different ways).  
 216. See Freedom of Speech:  Unholy Silence, ECONOMIST (Jan. 27, 2015), 
http://www.economist.com/news/international/21640747-middle-east-free-expression-rarity-
blasphemy-laws-are-favoured-tools [https://perma.cc/9ZSK-EMXN] (discussing the lack of 
free speech in many Middle Eastern countries). 
 217. See Terrorism Act 2006, c. 11, pt. 1 (Eng.). 
 218. Id. 
 219. See id. 
 220. See supra Part I.A.4. 
 221. See Grierson et al., supra note 110. 
 222. Terrorism Act 2006, c. 11, pt. 1(5)(i)(b) (Eng.). 
 223. See March, supra note 145. 
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like this.  Such discretion can become relaxed and lead to the targeting of 
specific groups or people.  The First and the Fifth Amendments safeguard 
against this precise situation.224 
b.  Israeli Approach to Proterror Speech 
When applying Israeli law to determine how the hypothetical poster’s 
speech would be treated, one must consider the primary focus on national 
security.225  Understanding Israel’s global position and the attitude of its 
neighbors, national security is of great importance to not only the Israeli 
government but also to the Israeli people.226   
Applying the near-certainty test would likely result in the speaker’s 
conviction.227  The hypothetical is a call to attack a city, not an idea or the 
government, which could be viewed as intangible.228  The attack is not a 
theoretical possibility, but a real possibility, and could thus be considered a 
near-certain threat.229  Additionally, any of the speaker’s previous posts may 
be considered to determine the context of the speech and if the speaker 
actually intended to incite an attack.230 
Indeed, the Israeli test is even less forgiving than the clear and present 
danger test and is more likely to result in speech being proscribed when 
national security is at risk.  The test balances the threat of national security 
against free speech rights, which are not absolute, much like U.S. law.  The 
speech would be punishable under the Israeli law; even if the speech were 
toned down, the importance of national security likely would lead to the same 
result. 
3.  The Clear and Present Danger Test 
An analysis of the fact pattern using the clear and present danger test 
reveals the most variation of any approach, and it is dependent upon which 
of the Court’s views is applied.231  While there are similar outcomes in the 
Court’s Schenck, Abrams, and Gitlow decisions, the reasoning that is and 
should be applied from each version of the clear and present danger test may 
vary with the present fact pattern.232  Holmes’s opinion for the Court in 
 
 224. See Jonathan Keim, Prosecutorial Discretion, Part II:  Its Limits, NAT’L REV. (Sept. 
29, 2014, 2:54 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/389067/prosecutorial-
discretion-part-two-its-limits-jonathan-keim [https://perma.cc/D4EZ-DC94].  See generally 
Part I.A. 
 225. See supra notes 115–23 and accompanying text. 
 226. See supra notes 118–20 and accompanying text. 
 227. See supra Part II.B. 
 228. See supra Part II.B. 
 229. See Buchandler-Raphael, supra note 115, at 6–7 (explaining that a theoretical 
possibility does not suffice for the government to proscribe the speech, which means that if 
the poster said “attacking the city would be wonderful!,” then it would not be punishable). 
 230. See id. 
 231. See supra Part I.A.1.  This is the early twentieth-century test for incitement used in 
the United States and it is less protective of individual rights. 
 232. Compare Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51–52 (1919), with Gitlow v. New 
York, 268 U.S. 652, 665–66 (1925), and Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919).  
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Schenck created a test that closely resembles the Brandenburg standard.233  
However, as applied in the subsequent cases, the test more closely resembles 
Israel’s and the United Kingdom’s laws.234 
While the clear and present danger test is similar to the Brandenburg test, 
the outcome from the test’s application would not be the same.  For speech 
to be punishable under the clear and present danger test, it must be shown 
that a danger exists that Congress has the authority to prevent through 
legislative enactment.235  Here, the danger is an attack on New York City, 
which Congress surely has the right to defend against.236  The remaining 
hurdle is showing that the speech indicates a clear and present danger.  
Indeed, a court would likely hold that it does.  The speaker gives a directive 
to attack, and if heard by the target audience, it could incite some to commit 
these acts.237  However, Holmes intended the test to incorporate an 
imminence factor.238  It would again be more difficult to prove that this 
speech would cause an attack immediately.  Often, the only way to prove 
imminence is for something to actually occur, and then retroactively punish 
the speaker for incitement. 
When a speaker posts that he wants the followers of his cause to attack a 
city and its citizens, the speech must be regulable under the clear and present 
danger test.239  This is the type of speech the Court wished to proscribe when 
it fashioned the clear and present danger test.240  The directive to those who 
see the message to attack is no different than attempting to cripple the United 
States government during a time of war; in fact, it is arguably a more present 
danger.241 
Even if the fact pattern were changed to be less direct by removing the 
second sentence to read only “I am calling on all supporters of our cause to 
 
Justice Holmes dissented from the Court’s opinion in both Abrams and Gitlow, writing that 
the clear and present danger test was being improperly applied. See supra Part I.A.1.  Even so, 
the test leaned in favor of the government because, at the time, the United States was facing 
the Red Scare, which in actuality posed no threat to the public on U.S. soil. See ARCHIBALD 
Cox, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 220 (1987).  The United States today faces terrorism, 
which is arguably a more dangerous threat than the Red Scare. 
 233. Compare Schenck, 249 U.S. at 51–52 (establishing the clear and present danger test), 
with Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 455–57 (1969) (per curiam) (applying the imminent 
lawless action test).  This comparison indicates that the imminence factor was important to 
both Justice Holmes and to the modified test suggested in Brandenburg. Even so, Schenck is 
far more government-friendly than Brandenburg.  
 234. Compare Gitlow, 268 U.S.at 665–66, and Abrams, 250 U.S. at 624, with supra Part 
II.B.2 (showing that the Court did not give the imminence factor due weight in applying the 
tests).  Foreign law is more concerned with the possibility of incitement occurring at any time, 
not immediately. 
 235. See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52. 
 236. The U.S. Constitution was established “in Order to form a more perfect Union, 
establish Justice, [and] insure domestic tranquility. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added); see 
also Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 40 (2010). 
 237. The target audience is the group of people that the speaker intended to incite to lawless 
action. 
 238. See supra notes 42–54 and accompanying text. 
 239. See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 627. 
 240. See Blasi, supra note 194, at 184. 
 241. See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 622. 
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wreak havoc in New York City,”242 it would still be a clear and present 
danger under the test that Justice Holmes developed for the Court.243  This 
test, while less protective of national security than the Israeli or U.K. laws, 
still provides the government with a great deal of power when prosecuting 
internet speakers.244 
National security is clearly an important government interest.  This does 
not mean, however, that individual liberties must disappear to keep the 
population safe.  Such an event would bring about a totalitarian 
dictatorship,245 which is why the Constitution protects rights to certain 
extents.246  The Court was very protective of national security in the Schenck 
era.247  When assessing the facts from the view of the Court in that era, it is 
much easier to rationalize the criminalization of speech under the clear and 
present danger test.248 
C.  Onus on Providers 
Are social media platforms doing good work at keeping terror-inciting 
speech off their websites, or should it not be their responsibility to monitor 
terror activity on their sites?249  Social media platforms have done a fairly 
good job at keeping hate speech censored, especially against prominent 
figures, and have gone so far as to ban users for breaking this code of 
conduct.250  But offending users continue to create accounts after their old 
accounts are deactivated, which gives companies no real control to 
permanently stop the offenders. 
A division of Google is working on keeping terrorist publications 
suppressed in online searches and is also developing technology to divert 
searches for terrorist content to content that argues against terrorist causes.251  
 
 242. See supra Part II.B. 
 243. See supra Part I.A. 
 244. The Schenck era cases are very protective of national security because they were 
decided during a time where there was a strong public fear that the country was threatened 
from the outside and the inside. See STONE, supra note 14, at 174. 
 245. The fear of all rights disappearing is one that has been conjured up by many; in this 
context, the Orwellian dystopia comes to mind, in which mere thought, without any verbal 
communication, can be criminal.  This, of course, is not the world the founders intended when 
they wrote the Constitution, which is why the Constitution protects individual rights from 
government infringement. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
 246. See id. 
 247. See STONE, supra note 14, at 153. 
 248. See generally supra Part I.A (highlighting the transition of the Court’s incitement 
standard and what it took to punish someone who may have been trying to incite others to 
lawless action). 
 249. See Andy Greenberg, Google’s Clever Plan to Stop Aspiring ISIS Recruits, WIRED 
(Sept. 7, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/09/googles-clever-plan-stop-aspiring 
-isis-recruits/ [https://perma.cc/3H3H-KF85]. 
 250. See Alina Selyukh, What Does It Take to Get Permanently Banned from Twitter?, 
NPR (July 20, 2016, 2:31 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/07/ 
20/486738705/what-does-it-take-to-get-permanently-banned-from-twitter 
[https://perma.cc/A8D8-ZSMJ]. 
 251. See Greenberg, supra note 249.  A division of Google is attempting to stop terrorist 
indoctrination where it can. See id.  It is redirecting users searching for content such as 
radicalization videos and posts to content that provides an alternative for these desires. Id. 
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Should this onus be placed on social media platforms?  If responsibility is 
placed on social media platforms, it could also be argued that it is the 
responsibility of the internet provider to deny access to those who further 
terrorist goals.252  This logic fails, and the onus should not be placed on social 
media platforms.  While it is helpful for companies to help protect the 
community when they can, companies are not be considered “speakers” when 
individuals post.253  Thus, companies should not be punished by the 
government.  Such punishment would likely drive companies to end their 
business instead of providing the service, which is valuable to many.254 
III.  FINDING THE RIGHT BALANCE:  
INCREASED PROTECTION WITHOUT TRUE SACRIFICE 
The current Brandenburg doctrine has failed to adequately protect against 
incitement.255  The United States has endured substantial terrorist attacks that 
could have been prevented by criminalizing terrorist speech, otherwise 
protected under Brandenburg.256  Accordingly, this Note proposes a change 
to the doctrine, which the Supreme Court ought to adopt to ensure national 
security and simultaneously avoid significant encroachment on individual 
First Amendment rights.  The proposed doctrine is flexible—in a time of war 
or heightened threat of attack, the ability to proscribe speech would be easier; 
in peacetime, it would be more difficult. 
The proposed test would no longer require imminence.  Rather, it must be 
shown that, because of speech directing, advocating, or encouraging lawless 
action, there is a substantial likelihood of a high level of harm.  The speech 
must have a fairly clear directive toward illegal action that could actually 
occur.  Other facts include the current political climate and the speaker’s 
target audience.  
A.  An Imminence Requirement Creates Room for Danger 
The imminence factor of the Brandenburg test is where the Court has most 
failed the public.  Imminence is an incredibly high hurdle for the government 
to overcome, because it primarily relies on a retroactive approach.257  With 
this approach, law enforcement agencies must wait for a tragic event to occur 
 
 252. See Xavier Amadei, Note, Standards of Liability for Internet Service Providers:  A 
Comparative Study of France and the United States with a Specific Focus on Copyright, 
Defamation, and Illicit Content, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 189, 213 (2002) (explaining that 
internet providers are not responsible for all the content that is put on the internet similar to 
how the state is not responsible for all car crashes on public highways but noting that U.S. law 
holds internet providers held responsible for illicit content and copyright infringement). 
 253. See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).  
 254. In fact, the Communications Decency Act provides a safe harbor for internet 
intermediaries that attempt to remove offensive material posted by users on their websites. See 
id.  See generally Catherine Tremble, Note, Wild Westworld:  Section 230 of the CDA and 
Social Networks’ Use of Machine-Learning Algorithms, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 825 (2017). 
 255. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 256. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 257. See supra Part I.A.3. 
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before they can prosecute a provocative speaker for inciting terrorism.258  In 
other words, the terrorist event must occur before one looks for the speaker 
who allegedly incited the event. 
The imminence requirement aligns with much of First Amendment law, 
which is underpinned by the premise that continued speech may encourage 
cooler heads to prevail and reliance on that is preferable to government 
regulation.259  The corollary to that premise is that government intervention 
is only permissible when speech has the intent and effect of causing imminent 
harm.260  In addition, the First Amendment generally prefers more speech 
because it is better for political discussion.261  But when it is fairly clear that 
the intent of the speech is not for political discussion, but to inspire harmful 
actions, more time and speech cannot be the answer.262 
When a dynamic internet speaker or leader has committed followers, there 
is too great a chance of serious harm to society, so allowing more speech is 
not a sufficient remedy.  The internet provides instantaneous results; it has 
brought the world closer together than ever before.263  With instantaneous 
results, instantaneous reactions are to be expected.  However, these posts 
remain on the internet for extended periods of time and thus can be seen by 
future readers.264  This means that speech posted in the past can incite action 
that would not necessarily have been considered imminent.  That logic does 
not work when the government’s interest is in protecting the public. 
B.  Substantial Likelihood and Level of Harm Creates Flexibility 
The likelihood factor265 from the Brandenburg test is a step in the right 
direction, but it does not consider the totality of circumstances that must be 
considered when proscribing speech.266  Substantial likelihood means that, 
not only must the threat of harm be possible, but the speaker must be likely 
to achieve his or her goal of causing that harm without government 
intervention.  If speech is purely political, it will not be deemed substantially 
likely to cause harm, but the more it borders on triggering lawless action, the 
more it can be regulated.  For instance, if someone calls on terror supporters 
to attack the moon, it is not only unlikely, but also currently impossible to 
cause this harm.  Instead, it could be considered political speech meant to 
spur discussion on how space colonization will one day take place.  While 
this example seems farfetched and ludicrous, it effectively illustrates how a 
 
 258. See Cronan, supra note 13, at 450–51. 
 259. See Blasi, supra note 194, at 482. 
 260. See id.  
 261. See Sedler, supra note 22, at 1017. 
 262. See Cronan, supra note 13, at 450–51 (explaining that, because of the ambiguity of 
the imminence requirement, any action not immediately following speech could be deemed 
not imminent). 
 263. See supra Part I.B. 
 264. See supra Part II.C.  While the onus theoretically could be placed on social media 
platforms, this is not the most effective or realistic manner to combat the issue. 
 265. The likelihood factor considers the likelihood of the speech causing imminent lawless 
action. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). 
 266. See supra Part I.A.3. 
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call to do something that is completely unlikely cannot, by default, be 
incitement. 
Substantial likelihood also makes the doctrine more flexible regarding the 
level of harm.  When there is a greater global threat or a more terror-prone 
time, there is a greater chance the incitement to terrorism will result in actual 
and greater harm.  By contrast, when there is a greater sense of calm in the 
nation, there is less of a likelihood of the action being carried out.267  Courts 
will apply a multifactor test to determine the action’s likelihood.  Factors that 
could be considered are:  (1) if the United States is in a state of war; (2) how 
many terror organizations exist and pose a present threat; (3) the number of 
attacks worldwide (and, more particularly in the West); and (4) the number 
of followers or supporters an organization has (as more people reading the 
message means it is more likely there is someone who will act on it).  At a 
certain point, courts will find a substantial likelihood of a high level of harm 
and the government could successfully prosecute a speaker.268 
This type of flexible doctrine addresses the critics who claim that the 
Supreme Court becomes too inconsiderate of individual rights during 
wartime.269  It will mean that the standards that the Court puts into place 
during wartime will be able to adapt and change with the transition to 
peacetime—without later being subject to abuse by courts and prosecutors.270 
This prong will also take into account the number of people who see the 
message or post.  If a person posts a message and only fifteen people see it, 
they are unlikely to stir up a result with their speech, no matter how 
inflammatory.  It means that the government will not be wasting its time or 
resources going after speakers who will only be heard by a small number of 
people and pose no substantial threat. 
C.  The Test in Sum 
The test would not require intent to cause lawless action.  Instead, it must 
be shown that because of speech directing, advocating, or encouraging 
lawless action, there is a substantial likelihood of a high level of harm.  This 
makes it most like the Israeli test and the clear and present danger test.271  It 
is most similar to these tests in that it looks to what the actual effect of the 
speech would be instead of to the intent of the speaker.272  These tests have 
been proven to protect people from terrorism through incitement by stopping 
problems at the source.273  Because the clear and present danger test is 
 
 267. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text.  
 268. This analysis requires courts to use their discretion to determine when the level of 
harm creates a substantial likelihood that the speech will cause lawless action. 
 269. See supra notes 196–202 and accompanying text (explaining that some scholars think 
that modifying doctrine during wartime is dangerous because rights would be improperly 
restricted later but also noting that a flexible doctrine can adjust the extent to which rights are 
limited during peacetime). 
 270. See supra notes 196–202 and accompanying text.  
 271. See supra Part I.A.2; supra notes 115–23 and accompanying text. 
 272. Intent need not be a part of the test because any speech that is inflammatory and 
targeted is likely to be spoken with requisite intent or purpose.  
 273. See Grierson et al., supra note 110. 
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constitutional and was never overturned,274 it is likely that this test is 
similarly constitutional and would thus be a viable solution to the current 
issue. 
D.  The Proposed Test’s Application 
Returning to the hypothetical, the directive-to-harm portion of the test is 
clearly met because the speech is calling for an attack.275  Since imminence 
is not a requirement, the speech is already on the fast track to being 
punishable under this doctrine.276  However, the hiccup will be in the 
substantial-likelihood prong.277  During wartime and when the speaker has 
many followers, his speech likely will be punishable.  However, during a 
relatively calm time or when few people see a message, the government 
should not prosecute because it likely will not lead to a conviction under this 
test.  Instead, the government should simply monitor the speaker’s social 
media account if conditions change. 
Using the technology the FBI plans to implement,278 the government will 
be able to determine whether it can assert jurisdiction by determining the 
location from which a speaker is posting.279  Additionally, using existing 
technology, the government can monitor speakers and understand their 
context to help determine if their speech constitutes actual threats and should 
be prosecuted. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court ought to fashion a new test to determine when 
inflammatory speech may be proscribed.  This test should do away with the 
imminence factor present in the current doctrine and more closely mirror 
older United States law and the laws of our peer nations.  The outcome should 
hinge instead on the substantial-likelihood factor, taking into account the 
current political climate.  The substantial-likelihood factor will allow the test 
to be dynamic for different types of speech and different periods in time.  This 
will prevent social media users from posting messages that lead to terrorist 
recruitment and incitement and will result in a safer world where individual 
rights are balanced against the importance of national security. 
 
 
 274. Brandenburg did not overturn the clear and present danger test but rather built on it, 
leaving room for the Court to return to its prior reasoning.  
 275. See supra Part III. 
 276. See supra Part III.A. 
 277. See supra Part III.B. 
 278. See supra Part II.B. 
 279. It is quite possible that a poster makes minimum contacts with a U.S. jurisdiction by 
attempting to incite this type of action regardless of where he speaks. 
